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Abstract
This paper investigates how attitudes towards the United States are a¤ected by pro-
vision of information. We generate a "panel" of attitudes in urban Pakistan, in which
respondents are randomly exposed to fact-based statements describing the US in either a
positive or negative light. Anti-American sentiment is high and heterogenous in our sample
at the baseline, and systematically correlated with intended behavior (such as intended mi-
gration to the US). We nd that revised attitudes are signicantly di¤erent from baseline
attitudes: attitudes are, on average, revised upward (downward) upon receipt of positive
(negative) information, indicating that providing information had a meaningful e¤ect on US
favorability. The within-subject design and data on respondentspriors allows us to investi-
gate the underlying mechanisms. We nd that revisions are largely a result of salience-based
updating. We reject unbiased information-based updating as the only source of revisions.
In addition, a substantial proportion of individuals do not respond to the information. This
heterogeneity in revision processes means that there is no convergence in attitudes following
the provision of information.
JEL Codes: D83, L80.
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1 Introduction
Favorable attitudes towards the US are rarer in the Muslim world than anywhere else (Pew
Global Attitudes Project; Gallup World Poll; Kohut and Stokes, 2006). This anti-American
sentiment is a concern because it delegitimizes democratic values, weakens Americas inuence
in foreign a¤airs,1 and correlates positively with a greater incidence of international terrorism
directed towards the US (Koehane and Katzenstein, 2007; Krueger and Maleckova, 2009). In
addition, many of the intractable conicts in the world today involve Muslim countries, and the
ability of the US to inuence the outcomes of these disputes depends on how it is viewed by
the locals. Therefore, understanding the sources of the anti-American sentiment in the Muslim
world has far-reaching political implications. However, there remains little direct evidence on
what drives these attitudes and whether providing information may change them.
Some experts have argued that anti-Americanism is a cultural phenomenon arising from
fundamental disagreements about social norms and values (Huntington, 1996). An alternate ex-
planation is that American foreign policy drives anti-Americanism (Cole, 2006; Esposito, 2007).
An additional factor in the Muslim world is the well-known anti-Western slant of media coverage
and the manipulation of public perceptions by political leaders and agencies (Ajami, 2001; Reetz,
2006; Fair, 2010). This distortion of information may play an important role in the formation
of attitudes and beliefs. As a result, policy-makers have argued that more information could
improve attitudes toward the US in the Muslim world (see examples in Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2004). But existing work also shows that more information does not necessarily lead to con-
vergence in attitudes (e.g., Lord et al. 1979). In this paper, we present evidence on whether
providing information to urban Pakistani youth can shape their attitudes towards the US, and
the mechanisms through which that may happen.
For this purpose, we conduct a randomized information-based experiment embedded within
a survey with young urban Pakistanis from distinct backgrounds. We surveyed a random sample
of 735 respondents from two large cities, and a sample of 1,691 students pursuing Bachelors-
equivalent degrees at three higher educational institutions in the two cities. The students at
these educational institutions di¤er in their religious and socioeconomic backgrounds, and have
varied exposure to Western and English-language news sources. Because of the institutional sort-
ing based on socioeconomic and other characteristics, these sub-groups represent very di¤erent
segments of the Pakistani society.
1Anti-American sentiment is generally cited as being a concern for US foreign policy in three main areas: (1)
spurring terrorism toward the US or its citizens, (2) harming US commercial interests abroad, and (3) making it
more di¢ cult for the US to achieve its policy goals or to rally support for its specic political objectives (Lindberg
and Nossel, 2007). While there is little robust evidence suggesting that anti-Americanism threatens cooperation
to ght terror, there seems to be greater consensus that Anti-Americanism is associated with increased ows of
personnel into terrorist recruitment streams (Charney and Yakatan, 2005; Berman, 2006), and with impeding
diplomacy and inhibiting implementation of US policy (Robichaud and Goldbrenner, 2006).
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We focus on Pakistan since it presents a particularly interesting case: First, it is considered a
crucial partner in the war on terror.2 Second, despite being a close geopolitical ally of the US and
a major recipient of US foreign aid, there is widespread concern in US policy circles about the
increasing anti-American sentiment in Pakistan.3 Third, as shown in Figure 1, Pakistani attitudes
towards the US are negative compared even to responses from other Muslim countries, and have
become increasingly negative since 2006. We focus on youth because the Pakistani population is
overwhelmingly young (72% are younger than 34, US Census Bureau, 2011), and give particular
attention to elite groupsdened as college-level studentsbecause these individuals will most
likely exert a strong inuence in their communities and some will eventually become policy
makers and dictate future policy.
Our goal is twofold: whether information can impact attitudes towards the US, and if so, how.
In addition, we are interested in understanding the heterogeneity in updating at the individual
level. Therefore, our main survey employs a within-subject design. We rst elicit respondents
baseline attitudes towards various countries and those countriespeople. Next, as part of the
experiment, survey respondents are randomly exposed to one of ve possible information treat-
ments, which provides them with fact-based statements describing the US in either a positive or
negative light. In the next stage, the respondentsattitudes are re-elicited. In the nal stage, in-
formation priors about the treatments are queried. This design allows us to explore the controlled
e¤ects of the information treatments and to make causal inferences about the role of informa-
tion on public opinion. It mitigates potential endogeneity issues related to the self-selection
of information sources. By employing both positive and negative information treatments, our
design also allows us to investigate whether responses to the two kinds of information di¤er in
some systematic ways. In addition, our within-subject design combined with the elicitation of
priors allows us to uncover the mechanisms of attitude revision, which is particularly relevant
from a policy point-of-view, and would be impossible to uncover using a between-subject design.
In particular, we evaluate whether the changes in attitudes are driven by updating (biased or
unbiased) of beliefs about US actions and/or changes in preferences/saliency attached to these
actions. We also collect rich demographic data, which allow us to explore, at a micro level,
how attitudes correlate with observable population characteristics, and whether the impact of
information varies by the respondents background.
2For example, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, while speaking to reporters on December 13, 2011 said
"Ultimately, we cant win the war in Afghanistan without being able to win in our relationship with Pakistan as
well". Similarly, his predecessor, Robert Gates, speaking at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on May
25, 2011, said, "Pakistan is very important, not just because of Afghanistan but because of its nuclear weapons,
because of the importance of stability in the subcontinent."
3The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in a speech to the Asia Society on February 18, 2011, when
referring to the dire state of Pakistans public nances said "shocking, unjustied anti-Americanism will not
resolve these problems" (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156815.htm). Similarly, on her rst visit
to Pakistan on May 27, 2011, following the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, she commented "Pakistan should
understand that anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories will not make problems disappear".
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Anti-American sentiment is high in our sample: the mean favorability reported for the US
is 2.58 (on a 0-10 scale, where 0 means very unfavorable and 10 means very favorable), which
is worse than the average rating of all other countries for which attitudes were elicited, with
the exception of India.4 Opinions are also heterogeneous, with groups that are wealthier and
more exposed to Western media holding relatively more favorable attitudes towards the US. US
favorability is positively correlated with respondentsperceived likelihood of US taking certain
positive actions (from the Pakistani perspective) in the future, casting doubt on the hypothesis
that attitudes are merely a cultural construct. We also document a robust relationship between
baseline US favorability and (actual and intended) behavior. First, respondentsstated likeli-
hood of migrating to the US if an economic opportunity were to come along is (economically
and statistically) higher for those with more favorable US attitudes. Second, respondents were
presented with an incentivized question where they could donate Rs. 50 (roughly 0.60 USD) to
a charity. We nd that respondents with more favorable US attitudes are signicantly less likely
to contribute to a conservative charity, and more likely to donate to a secular charity.
Turning to the experimental results, we nd that respondents change their attitudes toward
the US after being exposed to both positive and negative information: attitudes are, on average,
revised up (down) for positive (negative) information about the US.5 Moreover, average revisions
are substantial, varying between 0.5% and 29% of the standard deviation of the baseline attitudes.
The average revisions, however, mask the heterogeneity in response to the information. Nearly
half of the respondents in our sample do not revise their attitudes. Notably, the propensity to
revise attitudes is higher for students in the more selective Western-style university, and for those
more procient in English.
Policy-makers are interested not only in whether information can impact attitudes, but also
the channels through which that may happen. To shed light on that, we rst outline a model of
revision of attitudes in light of new information about US actions, with two possible channels:
(1) change in preferences for US actions, and (2) updating of beliefs about the likelihood of those
actions. The rst channel would suggest that respondents respond to the information even if they
were ex-ante aware of it, by changing their preferences (i.e., how much they value some specic
action) because of salience and/or availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Schwarz and
Vaughn, 2002; Dellavigna, 2009). The second channel is a pure information acquisition story:
respondents revise their attitudes because the new information changes their beliefs. Note that
the two channels have vastly di¤erent policy prescriptions. The latter would suggest that one-
time information campaigns may be su¢ cient, while the frequency and timing of the intervention
4We adopt a direct elicitation approach of attitudes. See Bursztyn et al. (2014) for an indirect revealed
preference approach.
5We nd an impact on attitudes towards other countries as well, in a treatment where relevant information
about them is presented to respondents. This indicates that the our results are not US-specic. This also alleviates
the concern that the e¤ects are driven by an experimenter demand e¤ect (something that is discussed in more
detail later).
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would matter if updating were a result of saliency. Whether information leads to convergence in
attitudes would partly depend on the extent to which information is processed in an unbiased
way.6
Data on respondentspriors about the information allows us to investigate the channels. The
average updating of respondents with positive priors (i.e., those who thought more positively
about the US than is warranted by the facts provided to them in the treatment) roughly 11%
of our sampleand of those with negative priors (~54% of the sample) is directionally consistent
with unbiased updating. However, these average revisions mask substantial heterogeneity in
revisions, which appear to be more consistent with salience-based updating: (1) respondents who
are ex-ante aware of the information have average revisions that are similar to those of their
counterparts for whom the treatments are new information (though this rst group is less likely
to revise their attitudes), and (2) respondentsrevisions depend on the inherent nature of the
information, irrespective of their priorrespondents in the positive (negative) treatment are much
more likely to revise upwards (downwards), conditional on their priors. In addition, we nd that
at least 29% of respondents have non-malleable attitudes- they do not revise their attitudes even
when the provided information was ex-ante unknown. Conditional on priors and treatment types,
we nd that respondents studying in less conservative institutions, those procient in English,
and those knowledgeable about foreign a¤airs all endogenous variables are more likely to
revise their attitudes and to do so positively. Overall, we can reject unbiased information-based
updating as the only source of revisions.
Our ndings suggest that (i) public opinions are not purely a cultural phenomenon, and
are in part shaped by information about recent events, (ii) they are malleable in the face of
new information, (iii) information on both positive and negative actions taken by the US a¤ects
Pakistanisaverage opinions of America in the expected direction, and (iv) response to infor-
mation is not uniform and seem to result primarily from saliency. Overall, this makes the case
for dissemination of accurate information about various aspects of the Pakistan-US relationship,
particularly those that are omitted or manipulated by the local media and agencies.
We test the robustness of various features of the study design. For this purpose, at a later
date, we conducted a follow-up study at one of the institutions that consisted of two surveys
elded a month apart. The follow-up consisted of both a within- and between- subject design.
Importantly, we can rule out an experimenter demand e¤ect driving our main results. While our
main results focus on the immediate impacts of information, we investigate the medium-term
impact of information in the follow-up survey, but nd inconclusive results.
Our paper is related to the literature focusing on how information inuences attitudes, mostly
in the political domain. There is a growing literature on the role of media exposure on political
6There is evidence that individuals have a propensity to discount new information if it is inconsistent with a
prior belief; in that case, information may in fact lead to more dispersed and polarized beliefs (Lord, Ross, and
Lepper, 1979; Glaeser, 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005).
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attitudes and behavior in the eld and in the lab (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Iyengar
and McGrady, 2005; Gentzkow, 2006; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009, 2011;
DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). A related literature investigates the impact of educational
content on attitudes (e.g., Fisman et al., 2009; Clots-Figueiras and Masella, 2013; Cantoni et al.,
2014). Finally, other work has investigated how attitudes change in light of various experiences
(e.g., Mullainathan and Washington, 2009; Beath et al. 2012). More generally, DellaVigna and
Gentzkow (2010) review the empirical literature on "persuasion" in various domains, though
their focus is mostly on behaviors rather than attitudes. Our paper complements this general
literature by providing causal evidence of the e¤ect of exogenously-provided information on
attitudes toward the US in a context which is both very policy-relevant and where attitudes are
extremely negative (and thought to be hard to change). Importantly, and unlike most of the
studies cited above, our paper also provides evidence on the mechanisms leading to the observed
changes in attitude. Our unique data collection methodology which elicits information priors
directly from respondents data that are otherwise not available and impossible to infer directly
from observational data allows us to investigate whether updating is a result of saliency or
information-processing, and whether such information processing is biased.7
Finally, as we model attitudes as a composite element of the beliefs an individual holds toward
the US actions (past and future) and his preferences toward these actions, our analysis relates
to existing work looking at how information inuences beliefs and/or preferences. Regarding
the formation of beliefs, existing empirical and theoretical work evaluates whether people are
Bayesian (e.g., El-Gamal and Grether, 1995), and why belief updating may depart from the
Bayesian model by providing explanations such as the use of heuristics (e.g., Tversky and Kan-
heman, 1973; 1974), conrmatory bias (e.g., Rabin and Schrag, 1999), the failure to account for
information repetition (e.g., DeMarzo et al. 2003), or limited memory (e.g., Mullainathan, 2002;
Shapiro, 2006). Regarding preferences, another strand of theoretical and empirical work explores
how information may change individual tastes (e.g., Becker and Murphy; 1993; Druckman and
Lupia, 2000; Glaeser, 2005; Bassi and Rasul, 2015). In our data, we nd evidence of both changes
in beliefs and preferences in response to information.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model of attitude
formation, and outline the possible channels through which our intervention may lead to a
(systematic) revision of attitudes. We describe the sample, study design and data collection
methodology in Section 3. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 sheds
light on the mechanisms that lead to revisions, and the underlying heterogeneity in the revision
7There is also a small related literature focusing on the correlates of anti-Americanism, primarily based on
cross-country comparisons. For example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) nd only a limited role of media use or
education on attitudes, but the type of media (e.g., CNN vs. Al Jazeera) and education systems matter. Blaydes
and Linzer (2012) nd that higher intensity of Secular-Islamist political competition increases anti-Americanism.
Zirkhov (2014) report an inverse-U-shape relationship between anti-Americanism and Human Development Index.
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process. Robustness checks are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Model of Attitude Formation
In this section, we present a simple model of attitude formation. The goal is to illustrate the
potential channels through which the provision of information may lead to a revision of attitudes.
For individual i at time t, Ait is an individual-specic measure of attitude towards the US. It is
a function of a set of past and future US actions 
it judged relevant to individual i at time t.
Ait = fit(
it);
where fit is a function that maps onto the reals, and Ait is a continuous variable with a higher
value indicating a more favorable attitude. 
it is indexed by t because individual i may change,
over time, what he thinks is relevant to form his attitude. Similarly fit is indexed by t since the
mapping function can be time-variant.
Actions are assumed to be numeric. Individual i may face uncertainty about the numeric
values of both past and future actions of the US. Let Pit(
it) denote the subjective distribution
that respondent i possesses at time t about the US actions. Individual is attitude for the US at
time t is given by:
Ait =
Z
fit(
it)dPit(
it):
Attitude is therefore a combination of preferences and beliefs over actions.8
For ease of presentation, we remove the subscript i below but it is understood that attitude
and its formation are individual-specic. Let now assume that the function fit(:) is linear and
separable in action, and that, at time t, we have 
it = fa1; a2g. We can rewrite the attitude as
follows:
At = 1t
Z
a1dPt(a1) + 2t
Z
a2dPt(a2) = 1tEt(a1) + 2tEt(a2); (1)
where jt (j = 1; 2) is the preference parameter, or weight, assigned by individual i to action aj
at time t, and Et(:) is is subjective expectation at time t.
Our experimental setup provides information about an action that the US has taken in the
past, i.e., a message m = fa1 = Kg :We consider specically a message about the action a1 that
enters directly is attitude. Note that the results would be similar if we consider an action that
8Note that in our survey, individuals are asked to express their preferences on a discrete scale from 0 to 10.
Ait is assumed to be continuous, taking values in the range [ALi; AHi]. We assume that respondents use the
function r(a) that rounds the continuous variable Ait to the nearest integer to report their opinion A
reported
it as
follows:
Areportedit = r(10
Ait  ALi
AHi  ALi ):
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does not directly enter is attitude but that is perceived by i as being correlated with an action
he cares about. We present below four di¤erent cases about how the message m may inuence
individual is beliefs and/or preferences, i.e., the fundamentals of the attitude.
Case 1 Unbiased belief updating. We dene an individual as exhibiting unbiased belief up-
dating if
 m = fa1 = Kg and Et(a1)  K implies that Et+1(a1jm)  Et(a1):
 m = fa1 = Kg and Et(a1) > K implies that Et+1(a1jm) < Et(a1):
Case 2 Biased belief updating. We dene an individual as exhibiting biased belief updating if
 m = fa1 = Kg and Et(a1) < K implies that Et+1(a1jm) < Et(a1):
 m = fa1 = Kg and Et(a1) > K implies that Et+1(a1jm) > Et(a1):
Case 3 Saliency bias. We dene an individual as exhibiting saliency bias if m = fa1 = Kg
implies that i1t+1 6= i1t:
Case 4 Prior formation. We dene an individual as exhibiting prior formation if 
it = fa2g
in which case Et(a1) is not dened, and if m = fa1 = Kg implies that the individual forms
expectations Et+1(a1jm).
In case 1 of unbiased updating, an individual with prior belief that has lower value (resp.
higher value) of the action than the information provided in the message would revise her beliefs
upwards (resp. downward). In case 2 of biased updating, an individual with prior beliefs that
has lower value (resp. higher value) of the action than the information provided in the message
would revise her beliefs downward (resp. upward). Conrmatory bias is a specic example.
Case 3 points to a case in which the message changes individualspreferences by making an
action salient. Individual i may for example increase in absolute value the weight associated
with a1 after receiving information about it. Case 4 points to a case in which an individual had
no prior knowledge about a1, and information about it causes him to formulate an expectation
Et+1(a1jm). Note that this case is observationally similar to a specic case of saliency bias,
where i1t = 0 (no weight is put on the action initially) and i1t+1 6= 0. Though, in case 4, the
information is impacting beliefs, not preferences. Note that cases 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive.
Likewise, cases 1 and 4, and cases 2 and 4 are mutually exclusive.
The revised attitude after receiving message m is given by:
At+1 = 1t+1Et+1(a1jm) + 2t+1Et+1(a2jm);
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Without loss of generality, for the rest of this section, assume 1t > 0. Here is a set of
implications regarding the revisions of attitude following a message m.
Implication 1: Individuals whose attitude depends on US action a1 and have non-biased
belief updating (case 1) and do not exhibit saliency bias will revise their attitude upward when
the message has a higher value about the action than their prior expectation, and downward
when the message has a lower value than their prior. That is,
Et(a1)  K =) Ait+1  Ait;
Et(a1)  K =) Ait+1  Ait:
Implication 2: Individuals whose attitude depends on US action a1 and exhibit biased
updating (case 2) and do not exhibit saliency bias will revise their attitude downward when the
message has a higher value about the action than their prior expectation, and upward when the
message has lower value about the action than their prior expectation. That is,
Et(a1)  K =) Ait+1  Ait;
Et(a1)  K =) Ait+1  Ait:
Implication 3: Individuals with saliency bias (case 3) and for whom the message contains
no added information (Et(a1) = K) will revise their attitude following a message m. That is,
Ait+1 6= Ait when Et(a1) = K:
Implication 4: Individuals who exhibit prior formation about a1 (case 4) and do not exhibit
biased saliency bias will revise their attitude upward following message m: That is,
Ait = 2tEt(a2) < 1tEt+1(a1jm) + 2tEt(a2) = Ait+1:
In the implications above, we have abstracted from the slant with which the message m may
be delivered. The same message content m can be slanted in a positive or negative manner (e.g.,
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). We expect biased belief updating and saliency bias to be more
prevalent, and the extent of the bias to be greater, when a message m is slanted.
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3 Data
3.1 Survey Administration
We conducted our study in one Islamic University and two modern Universities located in Islam-
abad/Rawalpindi and Lahore between May and October 2010 (University sample). In addition,
a random sample of the populations in the two cities was also surveyed between July and Decem-
ber 2010 (City sample). The Islamabad/Rawalpindi metropolitan area is the third largest in the
country with a population of about 4.5 million. Lahore is the capital of the Punjab province and
the countrys second largest city with about 10 million inhabitants. Punjabis are the dominant
ethnic group in both metropolitan areas. We focus on two cities for practical reasons for the
data collection.
Data collection was conducted by the Survey Center (SC) a¢ liated with the Islamic Uni-
versity.9 The SC Team approached the schools for consent, and informed them that the study
dealt with decision-making and opinions/expectations of Pakistani youth. Furthermore, they
notied the schools that the study was being conducted on behalf of an international research
organization. A copy of the questionnaire was provided to the contact person of each institution
for vetting (however, the contact person could not keep a copy of the questionnaire with them).
The institutions in our sample are among the ve largest and best-regarded institutions in the
relevant category in that city. Among all the institutions we contacted, one university declined
participation. At each of the schools, a random sample of students was selected to participate
based on a listing of students provided by the registrars o¢ ce. Average response rate was about
70%. Data collection took about a week at the other institutions. To signal credibility of the
study to the students, members of the sta¤ of the institution at which data was being collected
were also hired for the data collection. Overall 1,691 students participated in the study. After
dropping 29 students with missing data for the key variables, we are left with a total of 1,662
students, of whom 477 were female.
In addition, for the City sample, a random sample of 735 respondents from the two cities
was also surveyed. The sampling frame for the two cities was provided by the Pakistan Bureau
of Statistics. The surveys were conducted face-to-face by enumerators of the same gender as the
respondent. The overall response rate was 38%, with the refusal rate being higher for females.
In the analysis, we pool the data from the two urban centers, since there are no qualitative
di¤erences between them in observables and attitudes. After restricting to respondents with
non-missing data for the main variables, we are left with 724 respondents, of whom 335 were
female.
9Besides having ample experience in conducting surveys, another main reason for hiring the IU Survey Center
for the data collection was that they were well-connected to both the secular and religious institutions in the two
cities. We believe this helped us in obtaining consent from the di¤erent types of schools for the data collection.
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To test the robustness of specic features of the study design used in the main study, we
also conducted a follow-up study in March-April 2013 at one of the institutions (the Liberal
University). This study was conducted on a fresh sample of 649 students, with no overlap with
the original study.
3.2 Description of Schools
Islamic Universities provide a liberal arts curriculum combined with Islamic teachings and
courses. For example, Economics is taught with a focus on Islamic principles of nance. These
universities have segregated campuses for males and females, and classes are taught in Arabic
or English. These institutions tend to be public and, therefore, are accessible to low and middle
income groups. Females account for about 40% of the student body at the Islamic University
that we surveyed.
The modern universities are similar to American colleges. They provide a liberal arts curricu-
lum, classes are taught in English, and campuses are mixed genders. Tuition at such institutions
tends to be very expensive so they cater to wealthy students. Females account for 15-30 percent
of the student body at the two institutions that we surveyed. However, because they di¤er in
their selectivity, studentscharacteristics and tuition level (as we show below), we classify the
two universities into two separate groups: a Selective Liberal University and a Liberal University.
The Selective Liberal University, as indicated by its name, is more selective and liberal than the
Liberal University, and caters to a higher socioeconomic segment within the elite section of the
society. Relative to Islamic Universities, the modern Universities are quite selective and their
entry requirements are such that they primarily accept students who graduate from private high
schools (which tend to have higher academic standards).
3.3 Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents the characteristics of students at the three institutions in the rst three columns,
and of the City sample in the fourth column. The sorting in terms of observables into these in-
stitutions is very drastic but as expected. As we move across the columns from Selective Liberal
University towards Islamic University in Table 1, the average socioeconomic characteristics de-
teriorate. If we compare the students to the City sample, we see that all institutions fare better
in terms of most indicators of wealth than the general populations in the two cities.
Students from the various groups also report di¤erent levels of self-reported religiosity and the
number of prayers per day. Students were asked to rate how religious they considered themselves
on a scale from 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious). Religiosity increases as we move
across the rst three columns of Table 1: the average religiosity is 5.4 for Selective Liberal
University students, 5.9 for Liberal University students, and 6.3 for Islamic University students.
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The former also pray much less frequently every day. Average religiosity and religious practices
of the City respondents are similar to those of Islamic University students.
Finally, exposure to English-language news sources declines and consumption of conservative
news sources increases as we move from column (1) to column (3).10 Remarkably, Islamic Uni-
versity students are almost twice as likely as the City sample respondents to get their news from
conservative right-wing sources.
The survey elicited respondentsbeliefs about the likelihood that the US would take certain
actions over the next ve years. The table reports the mean likelihood (on a 0-100 scale) as
reported by these students. We see that, on average, students at the Selective Liberal University
have the most favorable beliefs about these outcomes. For example, the mean likelihood that
Selective Liberal University students assign to the US stopping drone attacks in Pakistan over
the next 5 years is about a third, compared with a mean likelihood of 26% for Liberal University
and Islamic University students, and 16% for the City sample.
The 2013 follow-up study at the Liberal University (Follow-up sample) was conducted in 21
di¤erent classes, at the end of class time. The classes were randomly chosen by the registrars
o¢ ce, with response rates being close to 100%. Column (5) of Table 1 shows the characteristics
of the 649 students in the follow-up survey. Only a subset of demographic characteristics were
collected. Comparing the statistics with those in column (2) of the table, we see that the follow-
up sample is similar in observables to the initial sample at Liberal University (with the exception
of mean religiosity in the follow-up sample being higher, and age slightly lower).
3.4 Study Design
The details of data collection are presented in the Appendix. We now describe the relevant part
of the survey that was conducted in 2010; the follow-up survey is described later in section 6,
when we present robustness analysis. The 2010 survey essentially consists of three stages.
1. Baseline Attitudes: We rst survey respondents about their attitudes towards various coun-
tries, those countriespeople, and various Pakistani institutions. Unlike existing polls, such
as those by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which elicit attitudes by employing either
a coarse Likert scale (very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very un-
favorable) or a simple yes/noresponse, we use the following wording: On a scale from
0 to 10, where 0 means very unfavorable and 10 means very favorable, please tell me your
opinion of .... The advantage of this alternate wording is that it allows the responses to be
cardinal and interpersonally comparable, and allows respondents to express the intensity
of their attitudes in a more rened manner.11
10The classication of news sources as conservative is done in a subjective manner, since no objective metrics
exist. We classify Awsaaf, Zarb-e-Momin, Nawai Waqt, and Al Jazeerah as conservative news sources.
11Bursztyn et al. (2014) use a revealed preference approach to elicit attitudes towards the US. Their approach
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Attitudes were elicited for: the United States; Saudi Arabia; India; China; the United King-
dom; Americans; Chinese people; Pakistani government; Pakistani Military; and Pakistan
Political Parties. We refer to these attitudes as "baseline attitudes".
2. Information Treatment: Next, we randomly provided respondents with one of ve possible
information treatments (Table 2). The baseline attitudes and information treatment were
separated by a battery of questions on social and political issues. Each treatment contained
two or three pieces of fact-based information along with the news source providing the
information. The rst four treatments could be characterized as highlighting a positive or
negative aspect of the US-Pakistan relationship (from a Pakistani perspective). Treatment
1 (T1) provided information on US assistance to Pakistan with a negative slant (pointing
out for example that, during 2009, the nancial assistance that the US provided to Israel
was three times as much as the assistance the US provided to Pakistan), while T3 provided
information on US assistance in a positive way (pointing out for example that, in 2007,
the funds the United States disbursed to Pakistan were 21 times larger than the funds
China disbursed to Pakistan, and as many as 27 times the amount of funds Saudi Arabia
disbursed to Pakistan; China and Saudi Arabia are considered closed allies of Pakistan).
Similarly, T2 provided information on drone attacks (negative), T4 provided information on
humanitarian aid from US-based organizations (positive). Therefore, T1 and T2 provide
information that most would agree is negative about the US, while T3 and T4 provide
information that most would agree is positive about the US.12 T5 provides information
about countries other than the US, and is used as a placebo treatment.
3. Revised Attitudes: Immediately after being provided with the information, some of the
baseline attitudes were re-elicited as follows: "We would now like to re-elicit some of your
attitudes that were asked earlier. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means very unfavorable
and 10 means very favorable, please tell me your opinion of...". Respondents were encour-
aged to refer to their previous responses when reporting their attitudes. We refer to these
as "revised attitudes".
4. Information Priors: Since the e¤ect of information on attitudes (or beliefs) generally de-
pends on how new the information is, we also collected data on the respondents prior
about the information, i.e., we asked the respondent if each piece of information that we
is quite novel and has certain advantages. However, it yields a measure of anti-Americanism that is binary. The
limited variation in the measure makes it unappealing for our setting, where we are interested in revisions in
attitudes.
12However, there could be a perception that foreign assistance or humanitarian aid is used politically by the
US to enslave a country, and greater aid may instead be construed as an example of "capitalist or imperialist
exploitation" (Kizilbash, 1988). In that case, T3 (which reveals that US assistance to Pakistan is large relative
to other donors) and T4 (which reveals the extent of humanitarian aid work by US-based organizations) may be
interpreted as negative information treatments. This is an empirical question, which we investigate in Section 4.
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provided to them was already known, or whether it had a value that was higher or lower
than their ex ante expectation about it.
For example, consider the rst piece of information provided in Treatment 1: "During
2009, the nancial assistance that the US provided to Israel was three times as much as the
assistance the US provided to Pakistan (Source: US Aid)". We elicited respondentspriors
about this news item as follows: "Before we gave you this information, did you think that,
in 2009, the nancial assistance that the US provided to Israel was more than, less than or
about three times as much as the assistance the US provided to Pakistan?".
We refer to these as "information priors". While this is not the most natural way of
eliciting priors, this elicitation strategy was intentional on our part. One, respondents
could easily go back and forth in the questionnaire, and so could have easily revised their
priors if they were elicited before the information had been revealed. Second, because of
concerns that respondents may anchor to numbers presented to them in the information
treatments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), we chose to elicit priors this way instead of
asking them for a point response. In the follow-up study, comparing priors of a control
and treatment group, we test for the robustness of our design (see section 6). Note that,
with the exception of T4, our elicitation method does not allow respondents to not have
a prior. The underlying assumption is that a typical Pakistani is aware of the existence
of drone attacks, and that the US provides nancial aid to Pakistan and other countries.
These aspects of the Pakistan-US relationship were (and are) commonly discussed in the
local media, and it is therefore natural to assume that people have a prior about them. It
is less clear that many people were aware of the US humanitarian aid programs; hence we
allowed respondents to express the lack of a prior in T4. We discuss this feature of our
design in more detail in our robustness section (Section 6).
Three points about the study design deserve further discussion. First, respondents are ran-
domly allocated to an information treatment. Since individuals self-select their sources of in-
formation in the real world, randomly exposing them to an information treatment gets around
this endogeneity issue and allows us to evaluate the causal impact of information on attitudes.
Appendix Table A1 shows the characteristics across the treatment groups: with the exception of
religiosity (which is slightly higher for T1) and the proportion females, the sample is balanced
across the treatments.13 Second, we employ both positive and negative information treatments.
This allows us to investigate whether responses to the two kinds of information di¤er in some
systematic way. In principle, having a study design with one positive and one negative infor-
mation treatment would have su¢ ced. However, given that we know little about what kinds of
13The di¤erences, while statistically signicant, are rather small. Moreover, we control for these characteristics
in our individual-level analysis.
13
information matter for attitudes, we chose to have ve di¤erent information treatments. The
two negative information treatments focus on very di¤erent aspects: the relatively low nancial
assistance that Pakistan receives from the US (relative to some other recipient countries), and
di¤erent aspects of the drone program. The two positive treatments focused on either the human-
itarian work being done by US organizations or the relatively high nancial aid Pakistan receives
from the US (relative to some other donors). Including treatments with such a wide spectrum
of information then reduces the likelihood of respondents not nding any of these information
treatments relevant (in which case we would observe no causal e¤ect of information).14 While it
would have been useful for our analysis to present facts about the same underlying actions in a
positive and negative slant, it is di¢ cult to do so in practice if one wants to broaden the type
of actions considered. For example, drone attacks are inherently perceived as negative while hu-
manitarian aid is viewed positively. In our setup, a "negative" message can be one that contains
either negative facts or neutral facts with a negative slant. Whether and how the response to
the same information varies depending on the slant of the message is clearly an interesting and
relevant question for understanding attitude formation, but one that our study is unable to shed
light on.
Finally, we employ a within-subject design that allows us to study the mechanisms of attitude
revision at the individual level. From a policy aspect, we are interested not only in whether atti-
tudes can be impacted by information provision but also in how that might happen. One concern
with the within-subject design may be the experimenter demand e¤ect, that is, respondents may
revise their attitudes upon receipt of information simply because they believe doing so consti-
tutes appropriate behavior (Zizzo, 2010). This would lead to larger responsiveness in the within-
versus the between- design. On the other hand, respondents in the within-subject design may
anchor their responses to the baseline level, and may be less susceptible to revise their attitudes
upon provision of information- this would bias the revisions downwards. For our purposes, the
upward bias from the experimenter-demand e¤ect would be a bigger concern. While our main
analysis uses the within-subject design, section 6 presents results from the follow-up study which
employs both a within- and between- subject design, allowing us to investigate the robustness of
our study design.
14Since there is little prior knowledge of how relevant di¤erent kinds of information are for attitudes formation,
we restricted each information treatment to either positive information or negative information about the US,
but not both. As we show in the model section, restricting the treatments to either positive (that is, t > 0)
or negative information allows us to get clear predictions for how attitudes should be revised. Under reasonable
assumptions, that would generally not be possible if a treatment included both kinds of information.
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4 Empirical Analysis
We rst describe the baseline attitudes and how they correlate with other observable charac-
teristics and behavior. We then present the average treatment e¤ects and next look at the
mechanisms and heterogeneity in the revision process.
4.1 Baseline Attitudes
Anti-American sentiment is high in our sample: the rst row of Table 3 shows that the mean
favorability reported for the US in the full sample is 2.58, which is worse than the average rating
of all other countries rated, with the exception of India (2.02). Saudi Arabia and China are the
countries with the highest rating (average rating of 7.88 and 6.91, respectively). Opinions of the
American people are more positive than those of the US (3.8 versus 2.6, with the di¤erence being
statistically signicant at 1%). The large standard deviations indicate that there is considerable
heterogeneity in attitudes in our sample.
Looking at US mean favorability across the groups in column 1, we see that students at
the Selective Liberal University have the most favorable opinion of the US (3.9), followed by the
Liberal University students (2.7), the Islamic University students (2.3), and the City respondents
(2.2). The attitudes are statistically di¤erent across the groups (p-value<0.001 for F-test). There
is considerable variation in attitudes even within groups, as indicated by the large standard
deviations of attitudes within each group.
Figure 2 further underscores the extent of heterogeneity in attitudes both across and within
institutions. The modal US attitude at the Selective Liberal University is 4 (on a 0-10 scale),
and zero for each of the other groups; while only 14.0 percent of the Selective Liberal University
students assign a zero favorability to the US, 35-40% of the students at the Liberal and Islamic
University, and 54 percent of the City respondents do so. As can be seen in the gure, a non-
trivial proportion of respondents in each of the groups assign an attitude of greater than 5 to the
US: 26.3% of Selective Liberal University students assign the US a favorability of greater than 5,
while the corresponding proportions are 19.2%, 14.6%, and 15.9% for respondents at the Liberal
University, Islamic University, and City sample, respectively.
4.1.1 Correlates of Attitudes
The large standard deviations of the attitudes in the full sample, as well as within each institution,
indicate that attitudes are quite heterogeneous. While there is no evidence of a denite link
between poverty, education, and terrorism in the existing literature (Krueger and Maleckova,
2003; Abadie, 2006; Berrebi, 2007; Krueger, 2007), particular educational systems may mediate
the political attitudes of their students (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004). As shown in Table 3,
students enrolled at institutions with more religious and conservative curricula view the US less
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favorably. However, even at the most conservative institutions the Islamic University the
mean opinion is slightly higher than in the City sample. This suggests that education, regardless
of its content, is positively correlated with US favorability, at least in our sample.
However, since students select their schools, we cannot conclude that educational content leads
to di¤erences in US favorability. Table 4 shows how some of these characteristics correlate with
public opinion towards the US and Americans. We see that income, parentsyears of schooling,
and exposure to English-language media are positively associated with US favorability. On the
other hand, exposure to conservative media, religiosity and being inuenced by a religious leader
are negatively associated with US favorability.15 It is noteworthy that we do not observe any
signicant di¤erences in US favorability by gender or by foreign a¤airs knowledge (as measured by
a battery of six questions). While the relationship is not causal, the lack of signicance between
knowledge and attitude suggests that being better informed does not improve US favorability.
These relationships generally hold in a multivariate regression framework, reported in the
rst column of Appendix Table A2. Column (1) shows even a statistically signicant negative
relationship between US attitude and foreign a¤air knowledge. Columns (2) and (3) of the table
also include respondentsperceived likelihood of US taking certain actions in the next ve years
as independent variables. We see that nearly all these variables are signicant and of the ex-
pected sign, indicative of attitudes not merely being a cultural construct but being systematically
associated with subjective perceptions about future actions of the US. The coe¢ cients on these
variables are sizable: an increase in the perceived likelihood from zero to absolute certainty (that
is, 100 percent) of the US having a balanced approach to the Palestinian conict in the next ve
years is associated with a 2 point increase (on a 0-10 scale), on average, in the attitude towards
the US. Likewise an increase in the likelihood from 0 to 100 of the US increasing its (military
and civilian) presence in Pakistan is associated with a 0.6 point decline, on average, in the US
attitude.
4.1.2 Link with Behavior
Anti-Americanism is cited as a concern because of the belief that it is linked with behavior
that could have adverse consequences for the US. The existing evidence on this (cited in the
introduction) is usually indirect and, at best, suggestive. Our survey included a few questions
that collected data on behavioral outcomes that allows us to investigate the link between attitudes
towards the US and behavior.
The rst question elicits respondentswillingness to migrate to the US: "Now consider a
situation where, at the age of 30, you got a job o¤er that requires you to move to United States.
What is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you would move to United States and
15Blaydes and Linzer (2012), in their analysis of attitudes towards the US among Muslims in 21 countries, nd
similar correlations between anti-Americanism and religiosity and media exposure.
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take up this job o¤er if the job pays you X times the amount you expect to earn at age 30
[reported earlier in the survey]?", where X = {2, 5, 10}. The average probability in the sample
for migrating to the US when the job pays two times as much is 38 percent, which jumps to
62 percent when the job pays ten times as much. The rst three columns of Table 5 regress
the response to this question onto US attitudes and various demographic controls. Notably, the
coe¢ cient on baseline US attitude is precisely estimated, positive and economically meaningful:
a one standard deviation increase in attitudes is associated with about a 6.5 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of moving to the US when the job o¤er is twice as much as expected
salary. Students enrolled in the institutions are signicantly more likely to report a higher
likelihood of moving to the US, relative to the City sample respondents. Within the institutions,
students enrolled at the more conservative schools assign a higher likelihood of moving to the
US, especially at higher levels of earnings.
The second outcome that we look at is an incentivized question where respondents decide
which charity to donate Rs. 50 (~0.60 USD) to. We presented respondents with a list of 15
charities that operated in Pakistan and were fairly well-known. Respondents also had the option
of not donating to any charity in which case no one, including the respondent, got Rs. 50.
This was an incentivized question that was elded in the universities only, and payments were
actually made to the charities. The charities ranged from secular charities such as the UNICEF
to conservative charities. About 44.3 percent of the sample chose a secular charity, and 8.2
percent chose a conservative charity, with the remaining choosing local charities associated with
political parties and mainstream religious organizations. The dependent variable in column 4 (5)
of Table 5 is a dummy variable (on a 0-100 scale) for whether the respondent donates to a secular
(conservative) charity. We see that baseline US attitude is negatively associated with donating
to a conservative charity, and positively related to donating to a secular charity. The estimates
are statistically signicant and economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase in
attitude towards the US is associated with a 2.1 percentage point greater likelihood of donating
to a secular charity.
Overall, this indicates that attitudes towards the US are correlated with intended and actual
behavior.
4.2 Treatment E¤ect
We next test if our information treatments had an e¤ect on attitudes. As we explain in Section 2,
our treatments should lead to systematic revisions in attitudes if respondents nd the information
relevant (that is, m 2 
it) and if any of the four cases outlined in that section apply. The
mechanisms that may lead to revision are investigated in the next section. In the analysis that
follows, we drop observations where respondents revise their US attitudes by 9 points or more
(on a 0-10 scale), under the assumption that in such instances respondents either did not answer
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the questions seriously, made errors in answering, or did not understand the instructions. This
drops 70 of the 2,386 observations (that is, 2.9% of the observations). Keeping them in the
analysis has little impact on the results.
Treatments 1 and 2 present arguably negative information about the US, while Treatments
3 and 4 present positive information about the US. Treatment 5, on the other hand, does not
provide direct information about US actions; we return to it in the next section. The average
responsiveness to the treatments, in principle, should depend on the distribution of respondents
priors about the presented information. Figure 3 reports the mean baseline and revised attitudes
of the US, by treatment. We see that revised attitudes di¤er signicantly from the baseline
attitudes for treatments 2, 3, and 4, indicating that these treatments had a signicant e¤ect
on average attitudes towards the US. Average revision is negative for T2 (one of the negative
treatments), and positive for both the positive treatments. Figure 4 shows the whole distribution
of baseline and revised attitudes by treatment types. It shows that the average downward revision
in the negative treatment is driven by a shift of attitudes away from the middle range (3 to 5)
toward zero, while the average upward revision in the positive treatment is driven by a shift of
attitudes away from zero and toward attitudes of 5 to 10.
Table 6 also reports the average and median revisions (and corresponding e¤ect sizes) by
treatment. The revisions are substantial, varying from a statistically signicant downward aver-
age revision of 0.43 points in Treatment 2 (which corresponds to ~15% of the standard deviation
in baseline US attitudes) to an upward revision of 0.85 in Treatment 4 (which corresponds to 29%
of the baseline standard deviation in attitudes). T2 leads to a downward revision on average,
while T3 and T4 on average lead to upward revisions in attitude, which suggests that respon-
dents meaningfully revised their attitudes in response to both positive and negative information
(coe¢ cient on T1 is negative, but not statistically di¤erent from zero).16 These results suggest
that anti-American sentiment is not entirely based on fundamental cultural values (Huntington,
1996), and that it is malleable.
In addition to showing the average treatment e¤ects, Table 6 also shows the standard devia-
tions for the baseline and revised attitudes toward the US. For each treatment, we cannot reject
equality of baseline and revised standard deviations, suggesting that attitudes do not converge
upon receipt of information. This could possibly be a result of heterogeneity in the revision
process, which we investigate in the next section.
16That respondents, on average, revise their attitudes positively in T3 (which reveals that US assistance to
Pakistan is large relative to other donors) and in T4 (which reveals the extent of humanitarian aid work by
US-based organizations) suggests that, on average, greater aid and nancial assistance from the US are in fact
inferred as positive steps, and not as measures of "imperialist exploitation" (Kizilbash, 1988). Therefore, the
empirical results seem to be consistent with our categorization of these treatments as positive ones.
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Revision of attitudes for other countries Our focus has been on attitudes toward the US
but one may wonder if attitudes toward other countries are similarly malleable. Treatment 5 in
the initial study provides negative information about Saudi Arabia and China, two countries that
are considered close allies of Pakistan. Indeed, Table 3 shows that the average attitude is high
for those two countries: 7.9 for Saudi Arabia and 6.9 for China. The rst piece of information
of Treatment 5 emphasizes that the amount of funds Saudi Arabia disbursed to Pakistan were
quite low compared to those Pakistan received from the US, while the second piece of information
mentions restrictions imposed on Muslims in China. Table A3 shows a signicant decrease, on
average, in attitudes for both China (of 1.8) and Saudi Arabia (of 0.5) for respondents allocated
to Treatment 5.
This suggests again that respondentsattitudes are malleable: they are responsive to negative
information about countries which are positively viewed. It also indicates that the treatment ef-
fect is not US-specic. The fact that respondents changed attitudes towards these other countries
mollies the concern that the impacts are driven by an experimenter demand e¤ect.
5 Mechanisms and Heterogeneity in Treatment E¤ect
The previous section shows interesting and sizable average treatment e¤ects. The within-subject
design and the elicitation of information priors allow us to investigate more precisely the hetero-
geneity in the revision process and the drivers of it. We investigate this next.
5.1 Information Priors
As explained in Section 3.4, we collected data from respondents about their prior knowledge
of the information, i.e., we asked the respondent if each piece of information that we provided
to them was already known, or whether it was a positive or negative surprise for them. Note
that what is "positive" or "negative" is potentially individual-specic and depends on the sign of
the weight associated with the action in the attitude function. For example, some respondents
may view greater US assistance to Pakistan as a positive action, while others may view that as
a negative action. We do not have information to characterize each information treatment as
positive or negative at the individual level, and hence use the average treatment e¤ect to qualify
the actions described in Treatments 1 and 2 as negative, and the actions described in Treatments
3 and 4 as positive. To illustrate this, consider Treatment 1 which consists of the following two
pieces of information: (1) the nancial assistance that the US provided to Israel in 2008 was
three times as much as the assistance the US provided to Pakistan, and (2) the military aid that
Pakistan had received from the US since 2001 came to half of Pakistans costs of the war on
terror. A respondent assigned to Treatment 1 is categorized as having a positive prior for the
rst piece of information if he reported that he thought Israel had received less than three times
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as much assistance from the US than Pakistan. Similarly, he has a positive prior associated with
the second piece of information if he thought that Pakistans military aid from US covered more
than half of its costs. Respondents who report that the information is in line with their prior
beliefs are classied as having a neutral prior.17
Note that we elicit priors after respondents have seen the information. This was done primarily
to make sure that the elicitation of priors did not interfere in any way with the revision of
attitudes. In the robustness section (section 6), we investigate this feature of the design.
Table 7 presents the distribution of priors for each piece of information in each treatment;
the corresponding questions that were used to elicit priors are presented in the Appendix. We
see that negative priors are much more prevalent than positive priors in this sample, ranging
from 32% to 81% compared to 6% to 32% respectively, i.e., respondents ex-ante are more likely
to have negative beliefs about values of the actions of the US than is warranted by the facts.
These systematically erroneous beliefs about actions of the US are consistent with the local
media practices of slanted news coverage and prominence to selective (negative) actions of the
US (Reetz, 2006; Fair, 2010). Neutral priors range between 14 and 51%.
For the purpose of investigating how updating varies by information prior, we need to aggre-
gate the respondentsprior for each treatment. We dene a respondent as having, for a given
treatment, an "Overall Positive Prior" ("Overall Negative Prior") if the respondent had a pos-
itive (negative) prior for at least one piece of information, and a positive (negative) or neutral
prior for the remaining pieces of information. A respondent is categorized as having an "Overall
Neutral Prior" if he had neutral priors for all the pieces of information. Finally, we categorize
respondents as having "Mixed Priors" if they cannot be classied as having overall positive,
overall negative, or neutral priors. This, for example, would be the case when the respondent
has a positive prior about one piece of information, and negative priors about the other pieces
of information in the treatment.
The rst row in Panel A of Table 8 shows the distribution of information priors in our sample,
pooled across the treatments. About 11% of the respondents have overall positive priors, 54%
have overall negative priors, 7.5% have neutral priors, and the remaining 28% have mixed priors.
There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in information priors across groups. Information
priors are generally more negative as the institutions become more conservative. For example,
about 46% of Selective Liberal University students have negative priors, compared to 59% of
Islamic University students. It is interesting to note that students in the more conservative
institutions are more likely to have negatively-biased beliefs about actions of the US than a
random sample of the citiespopulations. One possible explanation for these cross-group patterns
17Respondents who respond "No" to Before we gave you this information, did you know that the U.S. Drones
are loaded with the consent of the Pakistani government, and that Pakistani Intelligence o¢ cials provide targeting
information to the United States? in T2 are dened as having a negative prior toward the US, while those
who report "yes" are dened as having a neutral prior.
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is the di¤erential exposure of these groups to di¤erent news sources (as shown in Table 1). The
low p-values of the F-tests for the equality of proportions across the groups indicate that the
di¤erences in the distribution of priors across the groups is statistically signicant.
The last three rows in Panel A of Table 8 show that the distribution of overall negative, posi-
tive or neutral priors is di¤erent across positive and negative treatments: for example, respondents
are more likely to have overall negative (positive) priors for negative (positive) treatments. Priors
may vary systematically across the positive and negative treatments since they contain di¤erent
facts.
5.2 Mechanisms
In an unbiased revision framework, attitudesrevision depends on priors about the information:
we should see upward revisions for individuals with negative priors for events that enter with
a positive weight in the attitude function (i.e., the weight  > 0), downward revisions for
individuals with positive priors (for events with a positive weight in the attitude function), and
no revisions for people who already knew the information we provided them.
5.2.1 Treatment-level Heterogeneity
Panel B of Table 8 shows the baseline and revised attitudes toward the US, as well as the
revision by information prior. The last row shows a slight downward average revision for those
with overall positive priors (though it is not economically or statistically meaningful), upward
average revision for those with overall negative priors (signicantly di¤erent from zero at 1%),
and upward average revision for those with neutral priors (of a magnitude similar to those for
negative priors, and statistically signicant at 10%).
This suggests that average revisions for respondents with positive and negative priors are
directionally consistent with unbiased updating. On the other hand, the updating of neutral-
prior respondents cannot be explained by information-based updating. Another point to note is
that the median revision for all prior types is zero: indeed, 51% of the respondents do not revise
their attitude following the information treatment.
Table 9 presents further details about the underlying variation, and shows the proportion of
respondents who revised upward, downward, or not at all, by prior type. Non-revisions can either
be constrained for example, if the respondents baseline attitude is 0 (10) and she has an overall
positive (negative) prior or unconstrained; the table shows both separately. Panel A of the table
reveals striking heterogeneity in updating. Among those with overall positive priors, downward
revision is marginally more prevalent than upward revisions. Among those with overall negative
priors, upward revision is more prevalent than downward revision (26.6% versus 21.8%). Among
those with neutral priors, non-revision is much more prevalent (61% versus about 50% for the
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counterparts). These patterns suggest that unbiased belief updating cannot be the only source
of revision.18 Table 9 also shows that some respondents have non-malleable attitudes. A lower
bound for the proportion of those with non-malleable attitudes is given by the proportion of
those who had negative or positive priors, were unconstrained and did not revise their attitude:
[0.112 x 21.2%] + [0.536 x 50.1%] = 29.2%. The upper-bound is given by the overall proportion
of respondents who did not revise (i.e., 51%).
Panel B of Table 9 shows the updating distribution for positive and negative treatments. We
see that the updating patterns, conditional on prior type, di¤er by the nature of the treatment,
which is not what would be predicted under unbiased updating). The table shows that the pro-
portion of positive-prior respondents who revise downward is much higher in negative treatments.
The converse is the case for negative-prior respondents, who are much more likely to revise up-
ward when the treatment is positive (versus when negative). These patterns are consistent with
saliency bias and respondents being responsive to the inherent nature of the information they
receive, irrespective of their prior.
5.2.2 Individual-level Heterogeneity
We next turn to regression analysis in order to investigate individual-level heterogeneity in up-
dating.
Given the fact that only about half of the respondents revise their attitudes, we rst investi-
gate the propensity to revise ones attitude. The rst column of Table 10 regresses a dummy for
revision in attitudes onto priors (the excluded prior is overall neutral prior) and treatment type.
We see that individuals with non-neutral priors are all more likely to revise their attitudesthis
is sensible since we expect the treatment to be more informative for those respondents who are
ex-ante unaware of the presented information. We also see that respondents who receive positive
treatments are more likely to revise. Column (2) of the table interacts the prior types with
treatment type, and includes a large set of controls. There are now no longer any systematic
di¤erences in updating by prior or treatment type. We also see that, conditional on prior and
treatment types, respondents with more favorable US attitudes at the baseline, those enrolled in
less conservative institutions, those more procient in English, and those with higher exposure
to English media and greater awareness of foreign a¤airs all endogenous variables are more
likely to revise their US attitudes as a result of the intervention.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 investigate determinants of positive revisions in the sample.
Information-based updating would imply that the propensity to revise upward should not depend
on the treatment type, and should be higher (lower) for respondents with negative (positive)
18Recall that we assume here that the weight attributed to various actions in the attitude function is homoge-
nous and is of the same sign as described by the average treatment e¤ect. However, these patterns could also be
consistent with heterogeneity in the weight.
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priors. Column (3) shows little evidence consistent with this. One, respondents who receive
the positive treatment are substantially more likely to revise upwards (an average increase of
16 percentage points on a base of 26 percent). Since the specication controls for prior types,
this can only be consistent with saliency-based updating. Second, none of the coe¢ cients on the
prior types are signicant; that is, the propensity to revise upwards does not seem to depend
on respondentspriors. Column (4) includes prior type and treatment type interactions, and
a large set of controls. Again, the patterns are inconsistent with information-based updating.
We also see that, controlling for priors, respondents enrolled in the Selective Liberal University,
those procient in English, and those knowledgeable about foreign a¤airs are all more likely to
revise upwards. These patterns are indicative of endogenous positive selection into the decision
to revise upwards.
A natural question to ask is whether the information about the US also impacts attitudes
towards Americans and the United Kingdom. We conduct the same regressions as in columns
(1) and (3) of Table 10, except that the attitude now pertains to Americans or the UK. This is
analyzed in Table 11. The rst two columns show that there is no systematic relationship between
revisions for Americans and the treatment type or priors. This is not due to respondents not
revising their attitudes towards Americans: in fact, 55% of respondents revise their attitudes
towards Americans, and 30% revise attitudes upwards. This suggests that respondents make
a distinction between the US and Americans, and associate the foreign policy statistics that
we provide in the information interventions with the US establishment but not the American
public. Consistent with this interpretation, column (3) shows that respondents with non-neutral
priors are also signicantly more likely to revise their attitudes towards the UK (though, the
last column shows that positive revisions towards the UK are not systematically associated with
priors or treatment type). This would suggest that respondents construe actions by the US as
representative of those of the Western countries more broadly.
Overall, we nd little evidence that revisions of attitudes towards the US are consistent with
unbiased information-based updating. At the individual level, the propensity to revise attitudes
towards the US (and to revise them upwards) is driven primarily by endogenous characteristics
and largely unexplained by the content of the provided information. Instead the inherent nature
of the information seems to matter, suggestive of salience-based updating as the main driver of
revisions.
6 Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of specic features of the study design, we analyze whether: (1) our
results are robust to excluding people who are less likely to have a prior about the presented
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information; (2) our method of eliciting information priors after the provision of information
yields biased responses; (3) the experimenter demand e¤ect is driving updating in the within-
subject design; (4) credibility of information and tendency to revise attitudes are related; and
(5) the impact of information is persistent.
Points (2) to (5) are evaluated using a follow-up study conducted in April 2013 at the Liberal
University. The follow-up study was conducted in 21 classes randomly provided by the registrars
o¢ ce. Classes were randomly assigned to one of three groups:
 Control group: students were rst asked about their attitudes towards various countries
including the US, those countriespeople, and various Pakistani institutions. Demographic
information and information priors about two specic pieces of information were then
collected from respondents. These students constitute the "control" (C) group as they do
not receive any information treatment.
 Within-subject Treatment group: students were rst asked about their "baseline" attitudes,
followed by basic demographic information. They were then provided with two pieces
of information about past actions of the US regarding drone attacks in Pakistan; the
information was inherently of a nature that cast the US in a negative light to Pakistanis.19
Attitudes towards the US and the other entities were re-elicited, followed by elicitation of
respondentspriors about the two pieces of information. Up to this point, this design closely
follows the study design in the main study. We concluded by asking respondents about the
credibility of each piece of information on a 0-10 scale (with 10 being fully credible). We
refer to this group as the "within-subject treatment" (WT) group.
 Treatment group: basic demographic information was collected from students rst. They
were then provided with the same pieces of information as for the WT group. This was
then followed by elicitation of respondentsattitudes towards the US and other entities,
their information priors, and perceived credibility of the information. The "treatment" (T)
group design is very similar to that of the WT group, except that baseline attitudes are
never elicited from the respondents.
The assignment of students to the groups (C; WT; T) was randomized at the classroom level.
We were also interested in the medium-term impacts of information, and re-surveyed classes
about a month after the rst survey. This second survey simply elicited students attitudes
towards the US and other entities.
19Specically that: (1) The number of US drone attacks in Pakistan in 2011 was about 2 times (double) the
number of US drone attacks in Pakistan in 2008 (Source: New America Foundation). (2) During June 2004-
September 2012, as many as 34% of the casualties from U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan were civilians (Source:
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, London; Dawn, 2 July, 2012).
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Appendix Table A4 shows that the characteristics of students across the three groups are
generally balanced. Two exceptions are gender and age, which seem to di¤er across these groups.
This is primarily a consequence of the randomization being done at the classroom level, and hence
the gender or age composition being impacted by either the area of study or level of advancement
of the course. Note that we did not nd that those characteristics inuenced the revision process.
While the Control and Treatment groups have similar sizes, we assigned a larger sample to the
Within-subject group since most of the robustness checks pertain specically to within-subject
updating.
6.1 Lack of a well-formed prior
Our design does not allow respondents to express the lack of a prior (except for in T4 and for
one item in T2), and forces everyone to report a prior. One may worry that this feature of the
design biases the analysis towards nding no impact of priors on the revision of attitudes, and
so might lead to overstating the importance of salience as a revision mechanism. To address this
concern, we present two checks.
For the rst, we focus on respondents who are more likely to have well-formulated priors.
As a proxy for having a prior, we (1) use an indicator for high knowledge about foreign a¤airs
(measured as scoring at or above the median in a battery of questions in the survey about
foreign a¤airs), (2) focus on the students at the more selective schools (the Selective Liberal
University or Liberal University), and (3) focus on students who report watching CNN or BBC.
The idea being that each of these subsamples are arguably more likely to be informed and hence
have well-formed priors. Table 12 replicates the last two columns of Table 10, with interactions
between these proxies for having a prior and indicators for priors/positive treatment. The rst
two columns, where the "Knowledge Proxy" is an indicator for scoring at or above median on the
foreign a¤airs questions, show that the interaction terms are not statistically di¤erent from zero.
That is, it is not the case that the impact of priors on updating is any di¤erent for this subset
of respondents. It is also worth noting that the estimates of the uninteracted terms continue to
be similar to the corresponding estimates in Table 10. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 12 show similar
results when using the two other proxies for having a prior.
In our second check, we restrict the analysis to the treatments with news items that are more
likely to be covered by the local media, and for which our respondents arguably are more likely to
have well-formed priors. Given that drone attacks and US nancial aid assistance to Pakistan are
widely covered by the media, for this check, we restrict the analysis to the rst three treatments
(that is, we exclude T4 about US humanitarian assistance). The last two columns of Table 10
replicate the specications in columns (3) and (4) of the table, respectively, restricting to the
rst three treatments. We see that the results are largely unchanged.
While the possibility of some respondents not having well-formulated priors cannot be entirely
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ruled out, this analysis suggests that it cannot be a major concern in our interpretation of the
results.
6.2 Priorselicitation
In the main study design, information priors were elicited after respondents had seen the objective
information. One concern could be that this may yield biased information priors. We investigate
this directly in the follow-up study: a comparison of the distribution of information priors of the
C group (which was not provided with information) with the combined treatment groups (T and
WT combined) would allow us to investigate if our prior elicitation method is robust.
Table 13 shows the distribution of information priors for the control and pooled treatment
groups. Students were asked two questions.20 We see that the distribution of priors for both
questions is remarkably similar for the two groups. For example, it is not the case that more
students in the treatment group report ex-ante knowing the information (that is, having neutral
priors). The distribution of overall priors for the two groups is also similar: for example, 13.7% of
treatment respondents have overall neutral priors versus 12.0% of control respondents (di¤erence
not statistically signicant). Likewise, Table A5 shows that, conditional on observables, the
tendency to report a neutral prior does di¤er by whether one is assigned the treatment or not.
We take this as evidence of our method of prior elicitation being robust.
6.3 Credibility of information
One potential explanation for the fact that half of the respondents do not respond to the in-
formation treatment in our main analysis is that they simply do not trust the information we
provided. Our initial study did not collect information regarding studentsperceived credibility
of the revealed information. In the follow-up study, we investigate this possibility by asking
respondents how believable the information is. The question was worded as follows: "We would
now like to ask you how believable you nd each of the following pieces of information, on a
scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means I do not believe this information at all, and 10 means I fully
believe this information"." Table 14 shows high credibility rating for both pieces of information,
with a median of 7 and a mean of 6.8-6.9. Moreover, the distribution of credibility rating is
similar for respondents who revise and those who do not revise their attitudes, and notably also
20The two questions were asked as follows:
1. What was your best guess of how the number of US drone attacks in Pakistan during 2011 compared to the
number of US drone attacks in Pakistan during 2008? (mark one)
less than 2 times the number of US drone attacks during 2008; about 2 times. . . ; more than 2 times. . . ; I did
not think the US had conducted any drone attacks in Pakistan since 2008.
2. Before we gave you this information, what was your best guess of the proportion of casualties from U.S.
drone attacks in Pakistan that were civilians during 2004-2012? (mark one)
less than 34%; about 34%; more than 34%; I did not think that there had been any civilian casualties from
U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan during 2004-2012.
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across the distribution of prior types. This suggests that non-revision in attitudes cannot be
solely the result of respondents not nding the information credible, but rather a result of such
respondentsattitudes being non-malleable.
6.4 Within-subject versus between-subject design
One potential concern is that the revision of attitude in our within-subject design is driven by
an experimenter-demand e¤ect. There is little reason to believe that this would be a factor since
the surveys are anonymous and paper-based. The ndings that (1) half of the respondents do
not revise their attitude, and (2) the treatment e¤ect is not US-specic (as seen in Treatment
5), also suggest that this cannot be a dominant factor. However, we obviously cannot rule this
factor out.
The follow-up study allows us to investigate this. A between-subject treatment e¤ect can be
obtained from a comparison of the attitudes of the T and C groups. We can then compare it
with the within-subject treatment e¤ect (from the WT group) to investigate if the experimenter
demand e¤ect is an issue in our context. Given the negative nature of the information, we expect
the average e¤ects to be negative.
Table 15 presents the mean attitudes for the various groups. In the between-subject design,
the information treatment signicantly reduces the attitude toward the US: the di¤erence in the
mean attitude between the control and treatment group is -1.5. Here, we cluster the standard
errors at the level of randomization (class) using the Wild Cluster Bootstrap. Similarly, in the
within-subject design, the information treatment reduces the average attitude toward the US,
but by 0.6 points only. The di¤erence in average revisions across the two designs is statistically
signicantly di¤erent from each other (p-value = 0.014), suggesting that the design does matter.
But the revision in the within-subject design is smaller in magnitude than the revision in the
between-subject design, suggesting that anchoring toward baseline attitudes in the within-subject
design (and not an experimenter demand e¤ect, which would have led to larger revisions in the
within-subject design) is a dominant factor. This suggests that our main results do not over-
estimate how responsive attitudes are to information. Rather, they represent a lower-bound and
we may expect greater revision of attitudes outside of the experimental set-up. Note that we
favor the within-subject design since analyzing individual-level revisions provides direct insight
into the mechanisms underlying the revision process.
6.5 Medium-term e¤ect of information treatment
We nd sizable impacts of the intervention in our main study design as well as in the rst survey
of the follow-up study. A natural question is whether these impacts persist beyond the horizon
of the survey. Experimental studies of media campaigns tend to nd short-lived impacts on
27
attitudes (Iyengar and McGrady, 2005; Gerber et al., 2011).
The follow-up study consisted of two surveys, with the second survey being conducted about
a month after the rst. No identifying information was collected from students, and so we cannot
link the surveys at the individual level. Instead, since assignment to the groups was randomized
at the classroom level, we investigate the persistence of information at the classroom level by
comparing medium-term attitudes of classes in the T and WT groups with those in the C group.
We were unable to conduct the follow-up survey in one of the treatment classrooms since the
course had been completed by mid-semester. Errors are clustered at the classroom level, using
the Wild Cluster Bootstrap.
The rst row in Table 16 shows the average (baseline) attitude for the control group from
the rst survey, and the average attitude in the second survey. We see that mean attitudes for
the control group declined by 1.45 points over the course of a month. The second row shows the
revised attitude for the pooled treatment group in the rst survey. We see the average of 3.6 is
substantially lower than the average baseline attitude of 4.3 for the control group. Notably, we
see that the mean attitude for the treatment group in the second survey of 2.83 is remarkably
similar to that of the control group. This sharp drop for both the control and treatment groups
may initially seem surprising. However, the second survey was conducted in April 2013, less than
three weeks prior to the national elections in Pakistan, close to which the anti-America rhetoric
espoused by the mainstream parties increased substantially. We believe this is the factor behind
the drop in attitudes between the two surveys. Our intervention seems to have been much softer
than the changes in the political environment between the surveys. We are unable to conclude
if the e¤ects of the intervention would have persisted had the environment otherwise remained
the same between the two surveys.
7 Conclusion
Using an innovative information experiment embedded in a survey, this paper presents direct
evidence on the e¤ects of new information on Pakistani youthsattitudes towards the US. We
nd that respondents are responsive to the information and, on average, revise their attitudes
sensiblyattitudes about the US are revised upward (downward) when provided with positive
(negative) information about the US. Data collected on respondentspriors about the provided
information allow us to shed light on the mechanisms that lead to revisions. The distribution
of information priors in our sample is skewed, with respondents being much more likely to have
negative priors about actions of the US than having positive priors- a nding that is perhaps
not surprising given the context. The main mechanism that leads to revisions in attitudes
seems to be salience-based updating. Moreover, at least a third of our respondents have non-
malleable attitudes. We do not nd evidence of attitudes converging upon receipt of information,
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underscoring the heterogenous underlying mechanisms at play.
What are the implications of our ndings? First, our results indicate that public opinions
are not purely a cultural phenomenon, and are in part shaped by (perceptions of) recent events.
Second, attitudes are on average malleable in the face of new information. Third, the strong
saliency e¤ect suggests that news about the US may impact attitudes even when it contains no
information content. In a setting with an anti-US media slant, that can be worrisome.
A limitation of our study is that our results are derived from a controlled environment.
Attitude revision when presented with new information in a survey/experiment may be very
di¤erent from instances where individuals acquire the information themselves (Hertwig et al.,
2004), and where new information may not be as salient as it is in our setup. In addition,
given that our sampling strategy focuses on primarily educated individuals, it is unclear how our
results would extend to less-educated populations. However, since these individuals are more
likely to rise to positions of policy decision-making and to dictate future policy, understanding
the determinants of their attitudes is of particular relevance. Our study is also silent about the
best way to disseminate objective facts about the US to the Pakistani public and the Muslim
world more generally. Since domestic elites and media may have incentives to advance anti-
American attitudes in settings with high competition (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Blaydes
and Linzer, 2012), an important question then is how to make a counter-narrative based on
objective factsavailable to respondents, especially when they do nd such information useful.
The controlled nature of our experiment also means that we ignore general equilibrium e¤ects:
increased dissemination of information by the US may also lead domestic media to respond in
ways that may counteract such campaigns.
In addition, the medium-term e¤ects of new information on respondentsattitudes remain
unclear. While we conducted a medium-term survey in the follow-up study, the results remain
inconclusive and warrant further research. A challenge with providing information to respon-
dents and then re-surveying them after a few weeks is that the experimental information may
be diluted by changes in the respondentsenvironment, as seems to have been the case in our
follow-up study. An alternative to the approach used here is to instead generate an experimental
panel by re-surveying respondents over regular intervals separated by, say, a few weeks. Changes
in the geopolitical landscape in the Pakistan-US relationship would allow us to observe how
attitudes change. Challenges with such an approach include understanding how individuals self-
select their exposure to information, and measuring precisely the type of information individuals
were exposed to and their priors about the information. Note also that these alternatives require
longitudinal data, which to our knowledge remain unavailable. Until then, our study provides
unique evidence to policy-makers, the research community and the general public on how atti-
tudes toward the US can be shaped with the provision of objective facts about the Pakistan-US
relationship.
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Appendix A
A1. Data Collection
Institution Surveys
The survey sessions were conducted in groups of 50-100 students in a classroom of the stu-
dents institution. The rooms were large enough to ensure respondent anonymity. An anony-
mous questionnaire was given to each participant, read out by the experimenters and projected
on screen using a projector. The survey instrument was administered in Urdu at all institutions
except the Selective Liberal University where it was conducted in English, since students there
are more used to reading and writing in English.
The survey took about 90 minutes to complete, and consisted of four parts. The rst section
collected data on determinants of schooling choices (analyzed in Delavande and Zafar, 2014);
the second consisted of experimental games, that included the trust and dictator game (see
Delavande and Zafar, forthcoming); the third collected demographic details of the respondents;
attitudes and opinions on various social and political issues were elicited in the fourth section of
the survey. We use data collected in the last two sections of the survey in this paper. The survey
instrument was anonymous and no identifying information was collected from the respondents.
Students were compensated Rs. 200 (~USD 2.5) for completing the survey, and were additionally
compensated for the experiments (average compensation for which was Rs. 600). The total
average compensation of Rs. 800 (~USD 10) was substantial in the context of our setting.
City Sample Survey
The face-to-face City questionnaire was in Urdu. Consistent with Pakistani norms, respon-
dents were surveyed by enumerators of the same gender. However, respondents who were literate
were given the option of lling out the questionnaire by themselves. The survey instrument was
similar to that used in the institutions, except that it did not include any experimental games
(section 2 of the institution survey), and the schooling section (section 1) was modied.
The survey took about an hour to complete, and did not collect any identifying information.
One may be concerned that the face-to-face mode may inuence respondentsexpectations about
the enumerators judgment, and that may induce them to give responses that are socially de-
sirable (Marlowe and Crowne, 1968; Ho¤man, McCabe, and Smith, 1994). However, given the
widespread anti-Americanism in the Pakistani society (of which we also nd evidence), we do
not believe this introduces any signicant bias in responses. Moreover, the empirical results that
we describe later do not seem to support this concern. Respondents were compensated Rs. 400
(~USD 5) for completing the survey.
Follow-up Survey
35
The follow-up survey consisted of two anonymous surveys that were conducted a month apart
at the Liberal University. The surveys were conducted in English at LU in studentsclassrooms,
at the end of class. The rst follow-up survey took less than 10 minutes to complete, and
consisted of a section that collected basic demographic information and a section that elicited
attitudes and opinions on various social and political issues. Respondents were compensated Rs.
100 (which, in 2013, corresponded to ~$1). The second survey was conducted about a month
after the initial survey. It took about ve minutes to complete, and elicited attitudes towards
di¤erent countries. Since both surveys were anonymous, the panel analysis is conducted at the
classroom level.
A2. Prior Elicitation
Treatment 1
1. Before we gave you this information, did you think that, in 2009, the nancial assistance
that the U.S. provided to Israel was more than, less than or about three times as much as
the assistance the U.S. provided to Pakistan? (mark one)
 more than three times as much
 less than three times as much
 about three times as much
2. Before we gave you this information, did you think that the military aid that Pakistan has
received from the U.S. since 2001 was more than, less than or about half of Pakistans costs
in the "war on terror"? (mark one)
 more than half
 less than half
 about half
Treatment 2
1. Before we gave you this information, did you think that the number of US drone attacks
in 2009 was more than, less than or about 1.5 times the number of drone attacks in 2008?
 more than 1.5 times the number of drone attacks in 2008
 less than 1.5 times the number of drone attacks in 2008
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 about 1.5 times the number of drone attacks in 2008
2. Before we gave you this information, did you think that, during 2006-2008, the proportion
of casualties from U.S. drone attacks that were civilians was more than, less than or about
40%?
 more than 40% of casualties were civilians
 less than 40% of casualties were civilians
 about 40% of casualties were civilians
3. Before we gave you this information, did you know that the U.S. Drones are loaded with
the consent of the Pakistani government, and that Pakistani Intelligence o¢ cials provide
targeting information to the United States?
 Yes
 No
Treatment 3
1. Before we gave you this information, did you think that, in 2007, the amount of funds the
United States disbursed to Pakistan were more than, less than or about 21 times larger
than the funds China disbursed to Pakistan?
 more than 21 times larger
 less than 21 times larger
 about 21 times larger
2. Before we gave you this information, did you think that, in 2007, the amount of funds
the United States disbursed to Pakistan were more than, less than or about 27 times the
amount of funds Saudi Arabia disbursed to Pakistan?
 more than 27 times larger
 less than 27 times larger
 about 27 times larger
3. Before we gave you this information, did you think that, in 2009, the nancial assistance
that the U.S. provided to Pakistan was more than, less than or about 7.5 times larger than
the assistance the U.S. provided to India?
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 more than 7.5 times larger
 less than 7.5 times larger
 about 7.5 times larger
4. Before we gave you this information, did you think that the U.S. had more than, less than
or about tripled its nancial aid to Pakistan for the next ve years?
 more than tripled
 less than tripled
 about tripled
Treatment 4
1. Before we gave you this information, did you think that US AID had trained healthcare
workers to prevent more than, less than or about 900,000 children from contracting pneu-
monia in Pakistan in 2009?
 more than 900,000 children
 less than 900,000 children
 about 900,000 children
 I did not know that US AID had trained healthcare workers who in turn prevented
children from contracting pneumonia in Pakistan in 2009.
2. Before we gave you this information, did you think that US AID had treated more than,
less than or about 1.6 million children for diarrhea in Pakistan in 2009?
 more than 1.6 million children
 less than 1.6 million children
 about 1.6 million children
 I did not know that US AID had treated children for diarrhea in Pakistan in 2009.
3. Before we gave you this information, did you think that the U.S. provided more than, less
than or about Rs 1200 million to low income families across Pakistan to o¤set the impact
of poverty?
 more than Rs. 1200 million
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 less than Rs. 1200 million
 about Rs. 1200 million
 I did not know that the U.S. provided money to low income families across Pakistan.
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Figure 1: Evolution of US Favorability across selective Muslim Countries (Pew Global
Attitudes Project, 2011).
Figure 2: Distribution of Baseline Attitudes towards the US, by Group
40
Figure 3: Mean attitudes, pre- and post- information treatment, are reported for the 5 information
treatments. Sign-rank test for treatment e¤ect are: 0.4889 for T1; 0.000 for T2; 0.000 for T3; 0.000 for
T4. That is, the change of attitudes following treatments 2, 3, and 4 is di¤erent from zero at 1%.
Figure 4: Distribution of basline and revised attitudes, by treatment type.
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Table 1: Demographic Characteristics
Selective Liberal Islamic City Follow-up
Liberal Uni Uni Uni upa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Observations 357 594 711 724 649
Age 20.8 21.6*** 21.8*** 32.3*** 21.4
(3.8) (2.3) (2.3) (12.5) (7.9)
% Female 31.7 14.8*** 38.8** 46.3*** 13.5
Own years of educationb - - - 13.7
(4.5)
Parentsmonthly income (in 1000s Rs) 183 102*** 52*** 27*** 91.6
(223.0) (158.0) (88.0) (27.0) (108.4)
Fathers years of education 14.4 10.7*** 11.9*** 9.2*** 10.9
(1.9) (6.1) (3.9) (5.3) (6.2)
Mothers years of education 12.9 11.1*** 7.8*** 5.6*** 11.4
(2.9) (4.8) (4.9) (5.4) (5.1)
Number of siblings (including self) 2.6 3.9*** 4.4*** 4.7***
(1.4) (2.1) (2.2) (2.8)
% Parents own:
home 92 93 82*** 66***
television 89 84** 85** 72***
cell phone 90 80*** 82*** 91
computer 83 70*** 65*** 62***
internet access 75 50*** 44*** 41***
motorbike 47 62*** 47 42*
car 83 68*** 47*** 32***
Religiosity (0-10)c 5.4 5.9*** 6.3*** 6.2*** 6.6+++
(1.60) (1.80) (1.70) (2.20) (2.20)
Number of times pray each day (0-5) 1.9 2.5*** 3.2*** 3.4***
(1.50) (1.50) (1.50) (1.60)
% that fast during Ramadan 81 83 90*** 78
% watch/read English-language news 87 81** 83* 38***
% watch/read conservative news 33 47*** 51*** 29
% watch BBC or CNN 53 55 55 17***
% know victim of violent attackd 15 20* 32*** 14
Impact of religious leadere 2.65 3.09*** 2.55
(1.18) (1.20) (1.26)
General Knowledgef 3.11 2.66*** 2.88***
(1.49) (1.30) (1.35)
Percent chance (0-100) of the US:g
balanced approach to Palestinian conict 27.2 19.4*** 14.9*** 10***
closing Guantanamo Bay 31.2 24.6*** 23.1*** 14.4***
pulling out of Iraq 38.4 25.8*** 27.9*** 21.3***
pulling out of Afghanistan 36.7 26.9*** 29.9*** 22***
pushing for solution to Kashmir conict 28.2 16.7*** 15.5*** 9.7***
stopping drone attacks 33.4 26.3*** 26.4*** 16.3***
increasing presence in Pakistan 44.1 50.2*** 55.6*** 46.9
Mean value reported for each of the continuous variables. Standard deviations in parentheses.
The table shows pairwise t-tests for each groups characteristics versus those of the Western-style
University. Signicant at * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
a Follow-up survey conducted at Liberal University. +++, ++, + denote whether characteristics di¤er
from those of the initial sample in column (2) at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively.
b Respondents years of schooling. This is blank for the institution students since all of them are
students in a Bachelors program in their institution.
c Self-reported religiosity on a scale of zero (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).
d Percent of respondents who have an acquaintance died or injured in the violence in recent years.
e Impact of religious leader on political opinions (on a 1-5 scale, where 5 is the highest impact).
f Number of general knowledge questions correctly answered (out of 6 questions).
g The average perceived likelihood on a 0-100 scale of the US taking the following actions over
the next 5 years.
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Table 4: Variation in Baseline Attitudes by Demographic Characteristics
Opinions about:
Characteristics United States Americans
English Procienta Yes 2.91 (3.10) 4.13 (2.67)
No 2.25*** (2.86) 3.54*** (2.70)
English News Consumerb Yes 2.79 (2.99) 3.93 (2.56)
No 2.10*** (2.94) 3.62*** (2.95)
Conserv. News Consumerc Yes 2.40 (2.96) 3.64 (2.58)
No 2.69** (3.02) 3.97*** (2.77)
Age Highest Quartile 2.09 (2.89) 3.69 (2.95)
Lowest Quartile 2.88*** (3.02) 3.87 (2.60)
Female Yes 2.63 (3.03) 3.55 (2.59)
No 2.55 (2.98) 3.98*** (2.74)
Parents Income Highest Quartile 3.39 (3.06) 4.14 (2.64)
Lowest Quartile 2.01*** (2.89) 3.51*** (2.79)
Fathers Education At Least High School 2.76 (3.04) 3.91 (2.60)
Less Than High School 2.22*** (2.87) 3.69** (2.87)
Mothers Education At Least High School 3.05 (3.05) 4.01 (2.61)
Less Than High School 2.20*** (2.89) 3.70*** (2.76)
Religiosityd Highest Quartile 2.36 (3.02) 3.70 (2.74)
Lowest Quartile 2.74*** (3.04) 3.91 (2.76)
Times Pray per Day Highest Quartile 2.34 (2.92) 3.72 (2.70)
Lowest Quartile 2.95*** (3.08) 4.01*** (2.68)
Know Victim of Violencee Yes 2.49 (2.86) 3.89 (2.50)
No 2.61 (3.03) 3.83 (2.75)
Inuenced by relig. leaderf Inuenced 2.24 (2.80) 4.00 (2.45)
Not Inuenced 2.74** (2.97) 3.85 (2.41)
Foreign A¤airs Knowledgeg Above Median 2.55 (2.97) 3.96 (2.73)
Below Median 2.59 (3.01) 3.77 (2.68)
Mean attitudes reported. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Wilcoxon rank-sum test conducted for equality of means for the two groups for each demographic variable.
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.
a English Prociency is a binary variable if respondent reports to be procient in English.
b English news consumer is "Yes" if respondent reads at least 1 English newspaper or listens to at least
one English news channel.
c Conserv. new consumer is "Yes" if respondent reads or listens to at least one news source that can be
categorized as right-wing.
d Religiosity is on a scale from 0 to 10 (10 being very religious).
e Equals 1 if respondent has an acquaintance who died or was injured in recent violent attacks in the country.
f Equals 1 if respondent rates religious leader as having the most impact on own political opinions.
g Number of foreign a¤airs questions answered correctly (out of a total of 6 questions).
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Table 5: Behavior and Attitudes towards the US
Prob of Migrating to USa Donation to a charity:
2x salary 5x salary 10x salary Secularb Conservative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline US attitude 2.20*** 2.49*** 2.63*** 0.70* -0.56**
(0.23) (0.24) (0.26) (0.42) (0.24)
Selective Liberal University 9.36*** 15.39*** 9.74***
(2.83) (2.93) (3.18)
Liberal University 9.00*** 16.57*** 16.07*** 21.95*** -0.72
(2.42) (2.51) (2.72) (3.68) (2.06)
Islamic University 11.23*** 18.01*** 18.42*** 27.47*** 0.9
(2.18) (2.25) (2.44) (3.90) (2.18)
Age -0.32*** -0.37*** -0.49*** -0.36 0.23
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.45) (0.25)
Female -1.8 -1.61 -0.5 3.89 -3.71**
(1.56) (1.61) (1.75) (2.87) (1.60)
Parents Income 0.02 -0.02 0 0.14* 0
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Fathers Education 0.14 0.16 0.26 0.67** -0.12
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.28) (0.16)
Mothers Education -0.05 -0.02 0.12 -0.53* 0.17
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.28) (0.16)
Religiosity 0.54 0.13 -0.2 -0.16 0.03
(0.40) (0.42) (0.45) (0.79) (0.44)
Times Pray per Day -2.31*** -2.13*** -1.70*** -1.66* 0.91*
(0.50) (0.51) (0.56) (0.89) (0.50)
English Prociency 2.33 3.53** 3.53** 1.74 -2.05
(1.42) (1.47) (1.60) (2.52) (1.41)
Know Victim of Violence -1.12 -0.98 1.2 -3.44 2.05
(1.66) (1.72) (1.87) (2.86) (1.60)
English News Consumer 0.98 3.24* 4.35** -0.76 -2.13
(1.72) (1.78) (1.93) (3.30) (1.84)
Conserv. News Consumer 0.19 -1.61 -1.32 -0.34 3.62***
(1.40) (1.45) (1.58) (2.47) (1.38)
Inuenced by religious scholar -1.62 0.6 3.33 -4.3 4.60*
(3.06) (3.17) (3.44) (4.63) (2.59)
Foreign A¤airs Knowledge -1.74 0.28 -0.09 -4.26 0.92
(1.46) (1.51) (1.64) (2.68) (1.50)
Constant 34.26*** 43.31*** 54.53*** 33.42*** 3.54
(4.52) (4.69) (5.08) (12.10) (6.76)
Mean of Dep. Var 38 51 62 44.3 8.2
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.026
Number of Observations 2375 2376 2375 1662 1662
Table reports OLS regression of dependent variable onto various correlates.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a The probability respondent assigns to migrating to the US if their earnings at age 30 in the US
would be 2, 5, or 10 times as high as their expected earnings at age 30 otherwise.
b A dummy for whether respondent donates Rs. 50 to a secular charity.
Secular charities include the Afghanistan Women Council, Edhi Foundation, Pakistan Red Crescent,
and United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF). Conservative charities include Jamaal-ud-Dawa
(Falah-e-Insaniat) and Anjuman Faiz-e-Islam.
46
Table 6: Revisions in attitudes towards the US, by treatment and institution
T1 T2 T3 T4 p-valuec
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations 462 454 482 455 -
Baseline Attitude 2.44 2.32 2.48 2.8 0.074
[1] [1] [1] [2]
(2.89) (2.77) (2.94) (3.07)
Revised Attitude 2.42 1.89 2.84 3.66 0.000
[1] [0] [2] [3]
(2.99) (2.76) (3.05) (3.26)
Revisiona -0.02 -0.43*** 0.37*** 0.85*** 0.000
[0] [0] [0] [0]
(2.32) (2.50) (2.53) (2.58)
E¤ect sizeb 0.52 14.70 12.50 29.19 -
Table shows the mean [median] (standard deviation) of attitudes
about the US, by treatment.
a Revision is revised minus baseline attitude. Ttests conducted
for the signicance of the mean revisions. Signicance denoted
by asterisks. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
b Average revision, as a percent of the sample standard deviation
in baseline attitudes.
c p-value of the joint equality of attitudes/revisions across treatments.
Table 7: Distribution of Information Priors
Prior:
Observations Positive Negative Neutral
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T1: US nancial aid (neg)
Treatment 1 Q1 455 0.21 0.63 0.17
Treatment 1 Q2 457 0.23 0.44 0.33
T2: Drone attacks (neg)
Treatment 2 Q1 449 0.23 0.60 0.17
Treatment 2 Q2 450 0.26 0.44 0.30
Treatment 2 Q3 452 - 0.49 0.51
T3: US nancial aid (pos)
Treatment 3 Q1 474 0.24 0.41 0.35
Treatment 3 Q2 477 0.30 0.42 0.28
Treatment 3 Q3 475 0.32 0.37 0.31
Treatment 3 Q4 475 0.27 0.32 0.42
T4: US social and health (pos)
Treatment 4 Q1 451 0.09 0.71 0.20
Treatment 4 Q2 453 0.06 0.78 0.17
Treatment 4 Q3 453 0.06 0.81 0.14
Table reports the proportion of prior types for each piece of information, by treatment.
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Table 8: Distribution of Prior Beliefs about Information, by Institution and by Treatment
Overall Positive Overall Neg. Overall Neutral Otherd
Priora Priorb Priorc
Panel A
All 11.23 53.64 7.45 27.68
By Institution:
Sel. Liberal University 13.38 45.72 3.72 37.17
Liberal University 10.85 55.10 6.72 27.33
Islamic University 11.03 59.07 7.83 22.06
City Sample 10.70 50.80 9.45 29.06
F-teste 0.682 0.001 0.027 0.000
By Treatment type:
Positive Treatmentf 13.02 51.76 9.5 25.72
Negative Treatment 9.39 55.57 5.35 29.69
T-testg 0.013 0.101 0.001 0.056
Panel B
Baseline US Attitude 2.59 2.39 2.46 2.73
[1.5] [1] [1] [2]
(2.90) (2.86) (3.11) (2.98)
Revised US Attitude 2.57 2.64 2.76 2.86
[1.5] [1] [1] [2]
(2.87) (3.09) (3.19) (3.13)
Revisionh -0.02 0.26*** 0.30* 0.13
[0] [0] [0] [0]
(2.81) (2.48) (2.06) (2.60)
Panel A: each cell reports the percent of respondents (in the row group) with the column priors.
Panel B: reports the mean [median] (standard deviation) of attitudes towards the US.
a Dummy that equals 1 if respondent holds more positive beliefs about the US (than is warranted
by the facts) for at least one item of news in the relevant information treatment and neutral/positive
for the others.
b Dummy that equals 1 if respondent holds more negative beliefs about the US for at least one
item of news in the relevant information treatment and neutral/negative for the others.
c Dummy that equals 1 if respondent reports that the information that is being provided to them
in the information treatment was all already known.
d Dummy that equals 1 if respondents priors are mixed, i.e., they cannot be coded as positive,
negative, or neutral.
e p-value of a F-test for equality of proportions across institutions.
f Treatments 1 and 2 are negative, while treatments 3 and 4 are positive.
g p-value of a t-test for whether means are the same between positive and negative treatments.
h This row also conducts a t-test for whether mean change in attitude is di¤erent from 0. Sig.
denoted by asterisks: *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Heterogeneity in Revision Process
Overall Overall Overall Mixed
Pos. prior Neg. prior Neutral prior prior
Sample proportion 11.23% 53.64% 7.45% 27.68%
Panel A:
All Treatments
Downward Revision 26.40% 21.80% 15.90% 25.30%
Upward Revision 25.00% 26.60% 23.20% 26.30%
Non-Revision Cases 48.60% 51.60% 60.90% 25.30%
Constr. Non-Revisiona 27.40% 1.50% 37.00% 27.90%
Unconst. Non-revisionb 21.20% 50.10% 23.90% 20.50%
Panel B:
Positive Treatments
Downward Revision 18.90% 16.70% 11.20% 20.30%
Upward Revision 26.20% 37.50% 29.20% 31.50%
Constr. Non-Revision 29.50% 2.30% 32.60% 26.60%
Unconstr. Non-Revision 25.40% 43.50% 27.00% 21.60%
Negative Treatments
Downward Revision 37.20% 26.70% 24.50% 29.80%
Upward Revision 23.30% 16.10% 12.20% 21.70%
Constr. Non-Revision 24.40% 0.80% 44.90% 29.00%
Unconstr. Non-Revision 15.10% 56.40% 18.40% 19.50%
Table reports the proportion of respondents who fall in each cell.
Each column in each panel sums to 100.
a Respondents who do not revise their attitudes and have a baseline attitude of 0 (10) and a
positive (negative) prior, or a baseline attitude of 0 or 10 and a mixed or neutral prior.
b Respondents who do not revise their attitudes and are no constrained (per the denition in a).
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Table 10: Correlates of Revisions
Revision Positive
Dummy Revision Dummy
All Excludes T4a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline US attitude 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Positive Treatment 0.05** 0.01 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.17**
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Overall Positive Prior 0.13** 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Overall Negative Prior 0.10** 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Mixed Prior 0.13*** 0.08 0.06 0.09* 0.06 0.09*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Pos Prior x Pos Treat. -0.04 -0.08 -0.04
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Neg Prior x Pos Treat. 0.08 0.02 0.05
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Mixed Prior x Pos Treat. -0.02 -0.10 -0.10
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Selective Liberal Uni 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Liberal University 0.08** -0.01 - 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Islamic University 0.02 -0.03 -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0 0 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Income 0 0 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fathers Education -0.00* 0 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mothers Education 0 0 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Religiosity 0 0 0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Times Pray per Day 0 -0.01 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
English Prociency 0.04* 0.04** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Know Victim of Violence 0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
English News Consumer 0.05* 0.03 0
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Conserv News Consumer -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Foreign A¤airs Knowledge 0.04* 0.04* 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Inuenced by relig scholar -0.01 0.04 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.14* 0.15*** 0.16**
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)
F-testb 0.32 0.068 0.4 0.12 0.117 0.365
F-testc 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean of Dep. Var 0.49** 0.49*** 0.26** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.23***
R-squared 0.006 0.12 0.032 0.093 0.019 0.081
Number of Observations 1853 1853 1853 1853 1398 1398
Table reports OLS estimates of a regression of the dependent variable
onto covariates.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a Restricts to T1, T2, and T3.
b Test of joint signicance of non-constant and non-demographic terms.
c Test of joint signicance of demographic terms.
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Table 11: Imapct of Information on Attitudes towards Americans and the UK
Attitude towards Americans Attitude towards the UK
Revision Positive Revision Positive
Dummy Rev Dummy Dummy Rev Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive Treatment -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Overall Positive Prior 0.07 0.03 0.13** 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Overall Negative Prior 0.07 0.03 0.09** 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Mixed Prior 0.07 0.03 0.08* 0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant 0.50*** 0.26*** 0.44*** 0.20***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
F-testa 0.359 0.989 0.069 0.540
Mean of Dep. Var 0.55 0.30 0.52 0.24
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002
Number of Observations 1853 1853 1853 1853
Table reports OLS estimates of a regression of the dependent variable onto covariates.
Std errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a Test of joint signicance of non-constant terms.
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Table 13: Robsutness- Elicitation of Priors
Question 1 Question 2 Overall
Neg Pos Neut Neg Pos Neut Neg Pos Neut Mixed
Prior Prior Prior Prior Prior Prior Prior Prior Prior Prior
Treatment 60.2% 11.7% 28.1% 49.7% 11.9% 38.4% 66.0% 10.7% 13.7% 9.6%
Control 64.6% 11.8% 23.6% 50.7% 12.0% 37.3% 69.7% 11.3% 12.0% 7.04%
p-valuea 0.346 0.973 0.290 0.831 0.992 0.821 0.404 0.851 0.594 0.345
Table shows the distribution of prior types for each question.
a p-value of a Chi-squared test between the treatment and control groups.
Table 14: Robustness- Credibility of Provided Information
25 p.a Median 75 p. Mean N
Info 1
Full sample 5 7 10 6.89 466
Revision type:b
Revised 5 7 9 6.86 156
Not Revised 5 7 9 6.58 80
Constrained Non-revision 5 7 9 6.70 89
F-testc 0.39
Prior type:d
Positive Prior 5 7 9 6.51 53
Negative Prior 5 7 10 6.91 281
Neutral Prior 5 8 10 7.06 130
F-teste 0.36
Info 2
Full sample 5 7 9 6.77 466
Revision type:
Revised 5 8 9 6.98 156
Not Revised 5 7 9 6.75 80
Constrained Non-revision 5 7 9 6.49 89
F-test 0.64
Prior type:
Positive Prior 5 7 9 6.86 53
Negative Prior 5 8 9 6.87 281
Neutral Prior 5 7 10 6.53 130
F-test 0.27
Table shows the perceived credibility of each information type, on
a 0-10 scale, where 10 is very credible.
a The 25th percentile of the response to the credibility questions.
b Sample restricted to the within-treatment (WT) group.
c p-value of a F-test of the equality of means by revision type (revision
and non-revision).
d Sample is restricted to the combined WT and T groups.
e p-value of a F-test of the equality of means by prior type.
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Table 15: Within- and Between- subject Treatment E¤ects
Observations Attitudes Mean
Baseline Revised Revision p-value
Between-subjects control (C) 160 4.26 -
(3.76)
Between-subjects treated (T) 121 - 2.75 -1.51 0.000b
(3.23) [3.61]a
Within-subject treatment (WT) 338 4.46 3.83 -0.63 0.003c
(3.44) (3.50) [3.79]
T-test for WT - (T-C) 0.014d
Mean (standard deviation) shown in the table.
a Standard deviation based on Wild cluster bootstrap (at classroom level) in square brackets.
b p-value of an unpaired t-test of whether the mean revision di¤ers from zero for the between group.
I.e., baseline of group C - revised of group T = 0
c p-value of a paired t-test of whether the mean revision di¤ers from zero for the between group.
I.e., baseline of WT - revised of WT = 0
d p-value of a test of whether the between and within subject mean revisions are statistically di¤erent.
Table 16: Medium-term Treatment E¤ect
Group N Initial Surveya Sec. Surveyb Di¤erence
Control 160 4.26 2.81 -1.45
(3.78) (1.07) [3.80]c
Treatment 394 3.56 2.83 -0.81
(3.47) (0.90) [3.57]
p-values of:
Initial(treatment) - Initial(control) 0.037
Di¤(treatment) - Di¤(control) 0.06
Follow-up(treatment) - Follow-up(control) 0.82
Mean (standard deviation) shown in the table.
a Baseline (revised) attitudes from the initial survey shown for the control (combined WT
and T treatment) groups.
b Attitudes from the second survey of the follow-up.
c Standard deviation based on Wild cluster bootstrap (at classroom level) in square brackets.
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Table A2: Correlates of Baseline US Attitudes
Dependent variable: Baseline attitude towards the US
(1) (2) (3)
Selective Liberal University 1.25*** 0.783***
(0.25) (0.26)
Liberal University 0.236 0.076
(0.22) (0.22)
Islamic University -0.01 -0.111
(0.19) (0.20)
Age 0.022** 0.022***
(0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.111 0.057
(0.14) (0.14)
Parents Income 0.012** 0.013***
(0.01) (0.01)
Fathers Education 0.01 0.011
(0.01) (0.01)
Mothers Education 0.019 0.017
(0.01) (0.01)
Religiosity -0.044 -0.049
(0.04) (0.04)
Times Pray per Day -0.143*** -0.119***
(0.04) (0.04)
English Procient 0.693*** 0.655***
(0.13) (0.12)
Know Victim of Violence -0.042 0.019
(0.15) (0.15)
English News Consumer 0.378** 0.243
(0.15) (0.15)
Conserv. News Consumer -0.222* -0.259**
(0.13) (0.12)
Foreign A¤airs Knowledge -0.113** -0.065
(0.05) (0.05)
Inuenced by religious scholar -0.478* -0.448*
(0.27) (0.27)
US will have better approach to Israeli-Palestine 0.019*** 0.016***
(0.00) (0.00)
US will close Guantanamo Bay 0.007** 0.005
(0.00) (0.00)
US will pull out of Iraq 0.002 0
(0.00) (0.00)
US will pull out of Afghanistan -0.004 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00)
US will push for solution to Kashmir conict 0.008** 0.007*
(0.00) (0.00)
SA will reduce nancial aid to Pakistan 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
US will stop drone attacks 0.005* 0.005*
(0.00) (0.00)
US will increase presence in Pakistan -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00)
China will sign trade agreement with India 0.007*** 0.005**
(0.00) (0.00)
China will reduce nancial aid to Pakistan 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 1.89*** 1.93*** 1.47***
(0.42) (0.15) (0.43)
p-valuea - 0.000 0.000
Mean of Dep. Var 2.58*** 2.58*** 2.58***
R-squared 0.081 0.069 0.122
Number of Observations 2386 2386 2386
Table reports OLS regression of baseline opinion of the US on various correlates
(dened in earlier tables).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a p-value of a F-test of the joint signicance of the likelihood (about various US
actions) variables.
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Table A3: Robustness- Revision of Attitudes in a Placebo Treatment
Attitude
Country Baseline Revised Revision p-valuea
(1) (2) (3) (4)
United States 2.63 2.79 0.156 0.116
(2.89) (3.05) (2.13)
China 7.07 5.26 -1.81 0.000
(2.07) (2.97) (2.93)
Saudi Arabia 7.99 7.54 -0.453 0.000
(2.37) (2.55) (2.25)
Mean (standard deviation) shown in the table. Sample size: 463.
a p-value of a t-test of whether the mean revision di¤ers from zero.
Table A4: Demographic Characteristics of Follow-up Sample
Follow-up Survey
Initial Full C T WT p-valuea
Survey Sample Group Group Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Observations 594 649 160 139 350
Number of Classes - 21 6 5 10
Age 21.6 21.4 22.5 20.4 21.3 0.006
(2.3) (7.9) (11.8) (5.3) (6.4)
% Female 14.8 13.5 19.5 14.5 10.4 0.038
Parentsmonthly income (1000s Rs) 102 91.6 99.6 74.6 94.7 0.127
(158.0) (108.4) (109.5) (85.3) (115.4)
Fathers years of education 10.7 10.9 11.2 11.1 10.7 0.713
(6.1) (6.2) (6.2) (5.9) (6.3)
Mothers years of education 11.1 11.4 11 11.5 11.6 0.531
(4.8) (5.1) (5.4) (4.9) (5.1)
Religiosity (0-10)b 5.9 6.6+++ 6.8 6.5 6.6 0.430
(1.8) (2.2) (2.1) (2.1) (2.2)
Mean value reported for each of the continuous variables. Standard deviations in parentheses.
The table shows pairwise t-tests for column (2) versus column (1). Signicant at + p<0.10,
++ p<0.05, ++ p <0.01.
a F-test of equality of means across C, T, and WT (columns 3-5).
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Table A5: Correlates of Neutral Priors
Dependent variable: Neutral prior dummy
Question 1 Question 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Dummya 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Female 0.09** 0.10**
(0.04) (0.04)
Parents Income 0 0
0.00 0.00
Fathers Education 0 0
(0.01) (0.01)
Mothers Education 0 0
(0.01) (0.01)
Religiosity 0 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.41***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10)
Mean of Dep. Var 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48
R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.007
Observations 1292 1234 1286 1228
Table reports OLS regression of a neutral prior dummy onto
various correlates.
Clustered std errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01.
a1 if in treatment group, 0 if in control group.
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